conversation with elsie

 yielded:  chinese room, like turing test

 but also, something to say about embodiment:  artificial intelligence isn't (yet) embodied, and so misses affect as a constitutive embodied experience.  You can't "think" affect.  And an unembodied (distributed?  but that seems to imply across many bodies; nodal?) entity has no body to keep trauma's score.  

 I thought something that went like this:

 

Chinese room-->

Difference/distinctions between artificial and human intelligences (problematize)--> 

    -important for human supremacy/anthrocentrism

    -like Gopnik pointed out, changes as what artificial forms can do change; moving goal posts

One difference is feeling, affect, phenomenology

    -this is slightly better than the magic spark

    -although already seems like it might be too much to claim

    -note the harm done in this vein:  creating living forms as sub-human so as to normalize their pain (Black birthing mothers, ID or mental illness, NHI)

            -and consider what deeming an artificial form "unfeeling" enables:  the action of violation becomes putatively excusable since there is no valid self to violate (toaster rape scene; west world).  In each of these examples, the predictability of the victim's identities makes clear that this figure was relegated to the status of potential victim even without the fig leaf of inauthentic simulation (this is underlined by the identity of the human actor playing the violable robot  a "real woman"). 

Which somehow adds up to Tilly Norwood, and if consent is required--and whose--for her likeness to participate in sex. Ethically required, since it isn't functionally required (any  more than it is of embodied human figures), and the question "of whom" highlights the, like, flagship underpinning of consent logic:  it is someone's, and individual's to give, and being positioned as a giver of consent is the mark of the full liberal human (Kate Hayles, Emily Owens). When self-determination is available, a self can be said to recognizeably exist.  But in a Gopnik view, these goalposts have always changed--that is, the changing norms of who can consent is a marker of the changing taxonomies of who is human.

Embodiment is more of this, though.